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NOTES
LIKE A BAD NEIGHBOR, HACKERS ARE
THERE: THE NEED FOR DATA SECURITY
LEGISLATION AND CYBER INSURANCE IN
LIGHT OF INCREASING FTC ENFORCEMENT
ACTIONS
ABSTRACT
Privacy has come to the forefront of the technology world as third party
hackers are constantly attacking companies for their customers’ data. With
increasing instances of compromised customer information, the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC) has been bringing suit against companies for
inadequate data security procedures. The FTC’s newfound authority to bring
suit regarding cybersecurity breaches, based on the Third Circuit’s decision
in FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., is a result of inaction—Congress has
been unable to pass sufficient cybersecurity legislation, causing the FTC to
step in and fill the void in regulation. In the absence of congressional action,
this self-proclaimed authority is improper. This Note proposes that Congress
enact a law giving the FTC actual authority to regulate data breaches.
Thereafter, the FTC should use its rulemaking authority to establish
procedural data security guidelines for companies to follow; this Note offers
procedural guidelines for the FTC to enforce. It is necessary for companies
to know how to protect themselves against FTC enforcement actions. As
cyber risk is burgeoning, as self-regulation has proven insufficient, and as
the FTC is continuously bringing suit against companies for inadequate data
security, it is further necessary for companies to obtain stand-alone cyber
insurance to protect themselves in the modern marketplace.
INTRODUCTION
As hackers are constantly attacking companies for their customers’ data
and their corporate intelligence, privacy has come to the forefront of the
technology world.1 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has been
increasingly bringing suit against companies that it deems to have inadequate
data security procedures.2 Although the FTC currently reigns over more
territory than any other agency that deals with privacy,3 it is now necessary
1. See Stephen H. Jett, Corporate Boards Beware: The FTC is Watching, PRIVACY & DATA
SECURITY INSIGHT (Sept. 28, 2015), http://www.privacyanddatasecurityinsight.com/2015/09/corp
orate-boards-beware-the-ftc-is-watching/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_cam
paign=Feed%3A+PrivacyAndDataSecurityInsight+%28Privacy+and+Data+Security+Insight%29.
2. See Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and The New Common Law Of Privacy,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 588 (2014).
3. Id.
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for Congress to take control and enact legislation to direct the way in which
companies set their cybersecurity practices by giving regulatory authority to
the FTC; the FTC’s regulation of cybersecurity in the absence of legislation
is improper. Given the increase in the FTC’s regulation, it is essential for the
FTC to provide guidance to companies on how to protect themselves, and
their customers, from a data breach.4 As cyber risk5 is burgeoning, and as
self-regulation has proven insufficient, it is necessary that companies obtain
cyber insurance and that courts uniformly recognize such insurance as
sufficient.
The year 2014 demonstrated to the world the immense and inherent cyber
risk that companies face with cases including In re Target Corporation
Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, Financial Institution Cases, FTC
v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,6 and many more. Companies are currently
facing not only private civil actions in response to security breaches,7 but also
potential “governmental and regulatory investigations, fines, and penalties,”8
primarily led by the FTC. As cyber risks are causing first party losses, as well
as third party losses,9 the expenses due to these lawsuits have grown
exponentially. In its 2014 study on the costs of data breaches, the Ponemon
Institute found that the average breach in the United States costs an

4. “The term ‘data breach’ refers to ‘unauthorized or unintentional exposure, disclosure, or loss
of sensitive personal information, which can include personally identifiable information such as
Social Security numbers (SSN) or financial information.’” Gregory J. Evans, Regulating Data
Practices: How State Laws Can Shore Up the FTC’s Authority to Regulate Data Breaches, Privacy,
and More, 67 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 190 n.16 (2015).
5. Cyber risk “generally includes any loss exposure associated with the use of electronic
equipment, computers, information technology, and virtual reality.” Gregory D. Podolak, Cyber
Risk Coverage Litigation Heats Up as Exposure and the Insurance Market Evolve, AM. B. ASS’N
INS. COVERAGE LITIG. (June 13, 2014), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/insuranc
e/articles/marchapril2014-cyber-risk-litigation.html.
6. See Thad A. Davis, Michael Li-Ming Wong & Nicola M. Paterson, The Data Security
Governance Conundrum: Practical Solutions and Best Practices for the Boardroom and the CSuite, 2015 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 613, 640 (2015); see generally In re Target Corp. Data Sec.
Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154 (D. Minn. 2014); see generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide
Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
7. See JUDITH H. GERMANO & ZACHARY K. GOLDMAN, CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., N.Y. UNIV.
SCH. OF LAW, AFTER THE BREACH: CYBERSECURITY LIABILITY RISK 1 (2014).
8. Roberta D. Anderson, Viruses, Trojans, and Spyware, Oh My! The Yellow Brick Road to
Coverage in the Land of Internet Oz, 49 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 529, 539 (2014).
9. See Gregory D. Podolak, Insurance for Cyber Risks: A Comprehensive Analysis of the
Evolving Exposure, Today’s Litigation, and Tomorrow’s Challenges, 33 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 369,
374 (2015) (explaining that first party losses are those suffered directly by the affected company
and third party claims are brought by others against the compromised company); see Thomas H.
Bentz, Jr., Protecting Against Cyber Risk – A Primer on Cyber Insurance, HOLLAND & KNIGHT
(Jan. 15, 2015), https://www.hklaw.com/PrivacyBlog/Protecting-Against-Cyber-Risk-A-Primeron-Cyber-Insurance-01-15-2015/ (explaining that first party losses include: forensic investigation
coverage, data loss and restoration coverage, network business interruption coverage, cyber
extortion coverage, and theft coverage. Third party losses include notification costs, litigation
expenses, defense of regulatory proceeding costs, crisis management costs, online defamation, and
copyright and trademark infringement costs).
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organization around $5.58 million.10 Companies need to insure themselves
against these losses11 in order to remain competitive.
As of now, litigation surrounds the fragmented and disconnected
framework of state and federal laws governing cybersecurity obligations.12
Even with recent case law affirming the FTC’s open-ended authority to
regulate corporate privacy and data security under the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTCA),13 the law surrounding cybersecurity and cyber
breaches is far from settled. Furthermore, it is still unclear how the FTC will
regulate data security and other data practices without new, guiding
congressional legislation.14 There is an increasing need for more guidance
from Congress and a need for significant legislation on this topic.
Cybersecurity needs concrete laws15 and regulations similar to the data
security legislation in the financial and health industries.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the current state of cyber
crime and discusses the increasing threat of cyber attacks by hackers. Part II
discusses the FTC and its current regulations and heightened authority over
security breaches; therein this Note argues that, as of now, in the absence of
legislation, the FTC has too broad of a power in managing these cases, even
in the aftermath of Wyndham. Part III assesses the concept of cyber insurance
and delves into the need for companies to obtain stand-alone cyber insurance
coverage. Part IV of this Note argues for the clear need for congressional
legislation and, in-turn, FTC regulatory guidelines for companies to follow.
Part IV recommends procedural security guidelines for the FTC to enact and
thereafter enforce.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF CYBER CRIME
The quantity, sophistication, and severity of cyber attacks grow worse
every day.16 It has become clear that there is no such thing as an
10. See Allison Grande, Regulators Are Fueling Cyberinsurance Demand, Report Says,
LAW360 (Oct. 21, 2015, 7:58 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/717044/regulators-are-fuelingcyberinsurance-demand-report-says.
11. “In the case of individuals, a data breach involves stolen ‘personally identifiable
information’. . . . For corporations, it can involve various forms of sensitive or confidential
information such as client records, bid data, trade secrets, financial records, and litigation
information.” Podolak, supra note 5.
12. See GERMANO & GOLDMAN, supra note 7, at 2.
13. See generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015) (the court
held that the FTC has jurisdiction in connection with cybersecuity matters and also has the power
to regulate corporate privacy and data-security procedures pursuant to the FTCA). See generally
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) (2012).
14. See Evans, supra note 4, at 189.
15. See Derek E. Bambauer, Ghost in the Network, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1011, 1050 (2014); see
infra Part IV.
16. See Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Cyber Security, Cyber Governance, and Cyber Insurance:
What Every Public Company Director Needs to Know, THE D&O DIARY (June 4, 2014),
http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/06/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-cyber-security-cybergovernance-and-cyber-insurance-what-every-public-company-director-needs-to-know/.
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“unbreachable” firewall or an impenetrable security system; no technology
is immune from hacking.17 As “[a]t least ninety-seven percent of Fortune 500
companies have been hacked,”18 it is clear that cyber threats are a reality
faced by all in our modern world. Further, the National Security Agency’s
director stated that “[t]he ongoing cyber-thefts from the networks of public
and private organizations, including Fortune 500 companies, represent the
greatest transfer of wealth in human history.”19 According to Forrester’s
annual research, at least 60% of brands were predicted to discover a breach
of sensitive data in 2015, with the actual number being as high as 80% or
more.20
Today the cyber crime “market” is full of highly organized groups, often
connected with traditional crime groups, and is rapidly growing and
continuously innovating.21 This market is “full of increasingly sophisticated
organizations, people, products, and methods for communicating and
conducting business transactions.”22 Where cyber criminals originally
hacked merely for small, personal gain or bragging rights, the cyber
atmosphere has changed in recent years as hackers are looking for much
greater gain.23 Furthermore, modern software is too complex for defects to
be completely eliminated and hackers can infiltrate virtually any system;24 no
matter what protections a company places on its software, no software will
ever be completely secure. As this threat upsurges, market pressures have
been “pushing businesses towards better cybersecurity in order to remain
competitive.”25 In view of how significant the damage and potential liability
resulting from a data breach can be, companies cannot afford to be without
cybersecurity insurance.26
Even with the increase in cyber crime and the industry’s
acknowledgement of the need for greater cybersecurity, lawmakers have yet
to pass any significant data security enforcement legislation, which has led

17. Anderson, supra note 8, at 532.
18. Noah G. Susskind, Cybersecurity Compliance and Risk Management Strategies: What

Directors, Officers, and Managers Need to Know, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 573, 578 (2015).
19. Anderson, supra note 8, at 531–32 (alteration in original) (quoting DOUGLAS MAUGHAN,
BILL NEWHOUSE & TOMAS VAGOUN, THE NEXT WAVE BUILDING A NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR
CYBERSECURITY SCIENCE (2012), https://www.nsa.gov/resources/everyone/digital-media-center/
publications/the-next-wave/assets/files/TNW-19-4.pdf).
20. CYBERSECURITY VENTURES, CYBERSECURITY MARKET REPORT 26–27 (2015) [hereinafter
CYBERSECURITY MARKET REPORT], http://cybersecurityventures.com/cybersecurity-market-repor
t/.
21. See Lillian Ablon & Martin Libicki, Hackers’ Bazaar: The Markets for Cybercrime Tools
and Stolen Data, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 143, 144–45 (2015).
22. Id. at 144.
23. See id.
24. See Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1020.
25. Susskind, supra note 18, at 594.
26. See Daniel Garrie & Michael Mann, Cyber-Security insurance: Navigating the Landscape
of a Growing Field, 31 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECHNOLOGY & PRIVACY L. 379, 379 (2014).
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the FTC to intervene and fill the void.27 The FTC’s data security regulation
originally centered predominantly around cases of deceitful promises, but
today it has developed into something much greater—the FTC is suing
companies for vague promises of security, promises that hackers can easily
force these companies to break.28
II. THE FTC AND CYBER CRIME
A. THE FTC’S GROWING REGULATORY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
FTCA
While the FTC was established to ensure fair competition in commerce,
the agency’s powers expanded greatly with the enactment of the FTCA. The
FTCA’s goal was “to prohibit ‘unfair or deceptive acts or practices’ in
addition to ‘unfair methods of competition’—thereby charging the FTC with
protecting consumers directly . . . . “29 The FTCA gives the FTC an
amorphous privilege to broadly prohibit companies from engaging in
deceptive or unfair business practices.30 Unlike FTC claims for “deceptive”31
practices, where companies have broken their promises, “[b]eginning in
2005, the FTC began bringing actions under the [FTCA’s] unfairness prong
for companies that failed to use reasonable security practices to safeguard
customers’ personal information.”32 It was not until 2015 that a court held
that the FTC’s authority extended to regulating data security as unfair
practice.33 Now, the FTC has taken the lead—it plays a central government
role in data security enforcement.34 The primary source of its enforcement
power is Section 5 of the FTCA, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or

27. See Zosha Millman, After Big Win at Third Circuit in Wyndham Suit, FTC Will Continue to
Regulate Data Breaches, LXBN (Aug. 25, 2015), http://www.lxbn.com/2015/08/25/ftc-wins-bigwyndham-third-circuit/.
28. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 636.
29. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 598; see FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d
236, 243 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining that this occurred in reaction to “several early cases [which]
limited ‘unfair methods of competition’ to practices harming competitors and not consumers . . .
Congress [then] inserted an additional prohibition in §45(a) against ‘unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce.’”).
30. See Evans, supra note 4, at 201.
31. Alden Abbott, The Federal Trade Commission’s Role in Online Security: Data Protector or
Dictator?, HERITAGE FOUND. (Sept. 10, 2014), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2014/09/
the-federal-trade-commissions-role-in-online-security-data-protector-or-dictator. The deception
only occurs when “business conduct causes tangible harm to consumers who acted reasonably and
were misled.” Id. However, this Note only concerns the “unfairness” prong.
32. Justin Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. &
POL’Y REV. 355, 358 (2015).
33. FTC Held to Have Authority to Regulate Cybersecurity Practices Under Section 5 of the
FTC Act, CHADBOURNE (Sept. 24, 2015), http://www.chadbourne.com/sites/default/files/publicati
ons/150924_ftcheldauthorityregulatecybersecurity_clientalert_0.pdf [hereinafter FTC Held to Have
Authority]; see generally FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
34. See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 632.
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practices in or affecting commerce.”35 The FTC views this statute “as a
‘broad consumer protection mandate’ that Congress intended to allow the
Commission to respond to the ‘unanticipated, unremunerated threats’
consumers face in the marketplace.”36
To prove unfairness under Section 5, the FTC must prove the following
elements: “(1) an act or practice caused or is likely to cause substantial injury
to consumers; (2) the injury was not reasonably avoidable by consumers; and
(3) the injury was not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or
competition.”37 In 2014, The FTC Commissioner stated that “[t]his
[unfairness] standard calls for an economic analysis of the allegedly unfair
business practice. The economic analysis it invites is an appropriately
flexible one—incorporating not only the harms to aggrieved consumers but
also any benefits to consumers or to competition more generally.”38 These
elements, particularly the first,39 are easily met and further, the reviewing
court must accord substantial deference to the FTC’s interpretation of the
FTCA.40 “The FTC has issued over 170 privacy-related complaints against
companies,”41 and thus far, over the past decade, the FTC has pursued over
fifty enforcement actions under its deception and unfairness authorities
against companies that it considered to have “inadequate” data security
practices.42
B. FTC V. WYNDHAM WORLDWIDE CORPORATION
The 2015 Third Circuit Wyndham case is instrumental, as a court held for
the first time that the FTC’s “longstanding authority to regulate ‘unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce’ under [Section] 5 of the
[FTCA], extends to regulation of cybersecurity practices that are harmful to
consumers . . . . “43 In addition, the court held that the defendant Wyndham
35.
36.
37.
38.

Evans, supra note 4, at 201.
Id.
Id.
Abbott, supra note 31 (alteration in original) (citing Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, Remarks to TechFreedom and the International Center for Law and Economics, The
Economics of Digital Consumer Protection: One Commissioner’s View (July 31, 2014), http://www
.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/573061/010731techfreedom.pdf).
39. Very recently, the FTC further broadened the definition of “substantial injury.” In the FTC’s
Opinion and Final Order, In the Matter of LabMD, Inc., relating to charges of unfair trade practices
based upon alleged data security violations, the FTC asserted the authority to take data security
enforcement action against companies under the FTCA for their security practices regardless of
whether the data security violations have caused actual financial or physical harm to particular
consumers. In addition, the commissioners found that the FTCA “allowed for ‘preemptive action,’
meaning that no showing of actual harm [is] necessary.” David Heck, No Harm? No Matter. FTC
Broadens Data Security Liability, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), http://www.natlawreview.com/
article/no-harm-no-matter-ftc-broadens-data-security-liability.
40. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 613.
41. Id. at 610.
42. Abbott, supra note 31.
43. FTC Held to Have Authority, supra note 33.

2016]

The Need for Data Security Legislation

189

had fair notice that its cybersecurity practices fell short of the requirements
of the FTCA’s “unfairness prong.”44
The FTC filed suit against Wyndham after hackers on three occasions
accessed Wyndham’s network and its property-management systems. These
data breaches resulted in the exposure of private financial data45 from over
600,000 accounts46 and more than $10 million in fraud loss.47 Following
these breaches, the FTC began to investigate Wyndham’s data security
practices, and shortly thereafter brought legal action against Wyndham. 48
Wyndham declined to enter into a consent order and the FTC proceeded with
its first unsettled lawsuit,49 alleging that Wyndham’s cybersecurity
procedures, which had failed to protect customers’ personal and financial
data, violated the FTCA’s prohibition on “unfair” acts or practices.50
Wyndham had failed to implement reasonable data security by:
(1) allowing Wyndham-branded hotels to store payment card information
in readable text; (2) allowing the use of easily guessable passwords; (3)
failing to use firewalls and other readily available security measures; (4)
allowing franchisees and others to connect to the network without
appropriate precautions; (5) failing to adequately restrict access to its
network and servers; (6) failing to utilize reasonable measures to detect and
prevent unauthorized access; and (7) failing to follow proper incident
response procedures.51

Instead of settling, Wyndham challenged the FTC’s authority to bring action
against it under Section 5.52
Wyndham claimed that the FTC lacked the authority to charge the failure
to maintain adequate data privacy as an unfair trade practice because
Congress did not give the FTC authority to assert charges of unfair trade

44. See John P. Hutchins, Like Neiman Marcus, Wyndham is Not All It’s Cracked Up to Be,
LAW360 (Oct. 1, 2015, 10:27 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/708180?utm_source=rss&utm
_medium=rss&utm_campaign=articles_search.
45. See FTC v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp., 799 F.3d 236, 242 (3d Cir. 2015).
46. Greg Everts, Franchisors Take Note: FTC’s Authority to Regulate Corporate Data Security
May Affect You, FRANCHISE L. INSIDER (Sept. 14, 2015), http://franchiseinsider.quarles.com/2015/
09/franchisors-take-note-ftcs-authority-to-regulate-corporate-data-security-may-affect-you/.
47. 5 DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW §
28.04 35 (Matthew Bender Rev. Ed. 2015).
48. See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 641.
49. See Hutchins, supra note 44; see Evans, supra note 4, at 202 (explaining that consent orders
are FTC orders “in which companies agree to institute more robust data security procedures and
make long-term commitments to third party security assessments.”); see also Solove & Hartzog,
supra note 2, at 613–14 (explaining that the FTC has discretion in determining the “access and
scope” of the consent order procedure and that a typical FTC consent order contains “financial
penalties, bans on certain activities, and requirements for corrective action. It also commonly
contains reporting, audit, and compliance requirements for up to twenty years.”).
50. See Everts, supra note 46.
51. Id.
52. See FTC Held to Have Authority, supra note 33.
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practices regarding data security.53 Wyndham additionally claimed that, even
with such authority, the FTC’s enforcement of its unfairness claim before
formal promulgation of unfairness regulation violated fair notice principles.54
Wyndham filed a motion to dismiss, yet the court ruled in favor of the FTC,
holding: “(1) that the [FTCA’s] prohibition on ‘unfair’ acts and practices is
broad enough to grant the FTC authority over business data-security
practices, and (2) Wyndham, based on the plain language of the Act and FTC
statements, did in fact receive ‘fair notice.’”55 However, the Third Circuit
merely ruled that the FTC has the power to regulate these data security
practices under the FTCA. The case will go back to the trial court, where the
parties will litigate the issue of whether Wyndham’s data security practices
were actually “unfair” under the FTCA.56
Wyndham demonstrates that the FTC is one of the primary regulators of
cybersecurity and data-breach responses in the United States; the FTC sues
companies even when third party hackers cause the cybersecurity breaches.57
In the wake of Wyndham, it is very likely that the FTC will now use its power
much more aggressively and will increasingly overreach in its authority.
With the increase in investigations and, in turn, the increase in costs that
companies will face if and when the FTC brings suit against them,
companies’ boards need to make changes to defend themselves against such
actions.58
C. INAPPROPRIATE FTC AUTHORITY IN THE ABSENCE OF
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION
The FTC’s authority over cybersecurity breaches is a result of inaction—
Congress has been unable to pass significant cybersecurity legislation,
causing the FTC to step in and fill the void in regulation.59 This selfproclaimed authority, in the absence of congressional action, is unfounded
and should be challenged. Although consumer protection is necessary, when
weighing the costs and benefits of the FTC’s enforcement, as of now, the
FTC is doing more harm than good. If, however, courts continue to affirm
the FTC’s authority to regulate cybersecurity, as argued in Part IV infra,
Congress should enact a law giving the FTC authority to regulate these data

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See Bender, supra note 47, at 36.1.
See id. at 36.2.
Everts, supra note 46.
See Hutchins, supra note 44.
See FTC Held to Have Authority, supra note 33.
See Timothy Cornell, Wyndham: A Case Study in Cybersecurity: How the Cost of a
Relatively Small Breach Can Rival that of a Major Hack Attack, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS.,
Apr. 2015 at 15.
59. See Steven Caponi, To Business’ Chagrin, Cybersecurity is FTC’s Turf Now, LAW360 (June
10, 2014, 1:06 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/545258/to-business-chagrin-cybersecurity-isftc-s-turf-now.
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breaches. Thereafter, the FTC should use its rulemaking authority60 to
establish procedural guidelines for companies to follow. “When law specifies
cybersecurity measures, security improves.”61
Several issues undermine the FTC’s authority to regulate cybersecurity.
First, Congress has never explicitly granted the FTC authority to “initiate
enforcement actions challenging cyber preparedness.”62 In contrast, “in prior
Congressional proceedings, the FTC has repeatedly conceded that it had no
authority to regulate data-security, as evidenced by the fact that the FTC had
previously asked Congress to pass new legislation giving the FTC authority
to regulate data-security.”63 Further, Section 5 of the FTCA is silent on data
security; this section does not mention data security in any way, nor
applicable security standards for computer software systems.64 Section 5 also
does not provide clarity on the legally required data security safeguards, and
this is no clearer after the decision in Wyndham.65 Furthermore, the FTC
derives its authority from “a 100-year old consumer protection statute that
broadly prohibits companies from engaging in deceptive or unfair business
practices.”66 “When invoking its unfairness authority under Section 5, the
question the Commission considers is . . . ‘what was expected’ of the
company.”67 But, what is expected of the company? The FTC merely states
that the standard expectation is adequate data security.68 But, again, what is
adequate data security?
Due to the uncertainty surrounding cybersecurity law, it is unfair for the
FTC to sue companies for not knowing what constitutes “fair” and
“adequate” security measures. How can businesses ensure compliance
without published requirements from the FTC?69 The only guidance that
companies have is the FTC’s January 31, 2014 press release and the FTC’s

60. Congress gave the FTC such rulemaking and enforcement authority under COPPA in 1998.
See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 602. “In 1999, under GLBA, Congress gave the FTC, among
other agencies, the authority to ‘establish appropriate standards for financial institutions subject to
their jurisdiction’ in order to ‘insure the security and confidentiality of customer records and
information’ and ‘protect against unauthorized access.’” Id. at 602–03.
61. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1048.
62. Caponi, supra note 59.
63. Paul R. Gupta, Thomas Lahiff & Aravind Swaminathan, Living in a Post-Breach World:
What Regulators, the Courts, the Executive Branch, and Congress are Doing about Cybersecurity,
FINTECH L. REPORT, Jan.–Feb. 2014, at 1.
64. See Gerard M. Stegmaier & Wendell Bartnick, Psychics, Russian Roulette, And Data
Security: The FTC’s Hidden Data-Security Requirements, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 700 (2013).
65. See id.
66. Brookman, supra note 32, at 358.
67. Amanda R. Moncada, When a Data Breach Comes A-Knockin’, the FTC Comes A-Blockin’:
Extending the FTC’s Authority to Cover Data-Security Breaches, 64 DEPAUL L. REV. 911, 920
(2015).
68. See id.
69. Caponi, supra note 59.
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Guide for Business.70 Within the press release, the FTC maintained that its
enforcement of cybersecurity protections is based on a reasonableness
standard.71 The FTC standard requires that “[a] company’s data security
measures . . . be reasonable and appropriate in light of the sensitivity and
volume of consumer information it holds, the size and complexity of its
business, and the cost of available tools to improve security and reduce
vulnerabilities.”72 This standard “fails to address a practical reality—
implicitly recognized by the agency . . . that the ever evolving nature of
technology creates a moving target for agency enforcement as well as entity
compliance.”73 In addition, this standard “remains largely undefined by
courts.”74 It is simply unfair for the FTC to sue companies for the actions of
third parties under such a broad standard, in the absence of any congressional
guidance.
If the FTC wishes to continue its regulation, it should convince Congress
to pass a law giving the FTC authority to establish clear regulatory
guidelines. Thus far, the FTC’s guidance brochure merely states five broad
“key principles” for companies to apply in safeguarding personal
information. These key principles are:
(1) Take stock. Know what personal information you have in your files and
on your computers; (2) Scale down. Keep only what you need for your
business; (3) Lock it. Protect the information that you keep; (4) Pitch it.
Properly dispose of what you no longer need; and (5) Plan ahead. Create a
plan to respond to security incidents. 75

These vague guidelines are grossly insufficient. These standards are
inconclusive, as the Wyndham court suggests that it would merely consider
these factors relevant to a legal determination of reasonableness.76 The FTC
needs to adopt clearer guidelines, and in doing so, the FTC needs to provide
case specific cost-benefit analyses, demonstrating why it should be able to
sue companies, which it has yet to do.77 The FTC should not have authority
to sue companies when it gives no cost-benefit analysis and further fails to
prove any benefits that such suits will have for consumers.
70. See generally FED. TRADE COMM’N, START WITH SECURITY: A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS
(2015) [hereinafter START WITH SECURITY], https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plainlanguage/pdf0205-startwithsecurity.pdf.
71. See Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 64, at 695.
72. FTC Held to Have Authority, supra note 33.
73. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 64, at 695.
74. James D. Gassenheimer & Lara O’Donnell, Heightened Expectations: Mitigating the Threat
of Cybersecurity Litigation in an Ambiguous Regulatory Environment, DRI FOR DEF., Feb. 2015,
at 50.
75. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING PERSONAL INFORMATION A GUIDE FOR BUSINESS 1
(2016), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/pdf-0136_proteting-personalinformation.pdf.
76. See Gassenheimer & O’Donnell, supra note 74, at 53.
77. See Abbott, supra note 31.
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In addition, the FTC’s enforcement actions embody tactics that force
settlements. The FTC singles out vulnerable companies after they suffer a
very large and public data breach; it then investigates the breach and strongarms the company to stipulate to a consent order.78 Under such consent
orders, “companies agree to institute more robust data security procedures
and make long-term commitments to third party security assessment.”79 This
is a problem, as consent orders do essentially nothing; companies cannot
protect themselves using self-regulation. It should be repeated that virtually
every system, no matter the cybersecurity practices implemented, can be
breached. Therefore, it is a waste of the FTC’s time and resources to bring
suit and further require the company to implement procedures that are not
proven to prevent breaches, or to even shield it from FTC suit. The purpose
of these consent orders is to prohibit future wrongful activities.80 However,
the FTC has yet to prove that these supposedly inadequate security
procedures, like those at issue in Wyndham, are even wrongful.81 The FTC’s
inability to prove wrongful procedures demonstrates why the FTC should not
have this authority.82
D. COUNTERARGUMENTS
Conceivably, the FTC has informal data security authority sufficient to
regulate cyber breaches.83 Commentators argue that because Congress has
not imposed strict limits on the FTC’s authority, the FTC therefore has
implied authority to regulate cybersecurity.84 Further, because the Supreme
Court has established that courts “must defer to an agency’s construction of
the statute under which it operates, especially if Congress has failed to act or
speak out regarding the specific legal issue,”85 commentators argue that the
FTC is simply construing the statute since Congress has failed to act or speak
out on this legal issue. However, as shown below, these counterarguments
are misplaced.
Commentators contend that the FTC’s privacy jurisprudence has
developed “along classic common law developmental patterns.”86 The FTC
has stated that the unfairness doctrine is the “result of an ‘evolutionary
process’ that refines the standard over time through cases, rules, and

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

See Hutchins, supra note 44.
Evans, supra note 4, at 202.
See Moncada, supra note 67, at 913–14.
See Hutchins, supra note 44.
See generally The FTC’s Proposed Wyndham Settlement and its Implications for the
Regulatory Landscape, KING & SPALDING (Dec. 11, 2015), http://www.kslaw.com/imageserver/KS
Public/library/publication/ca121115c.pdf.
83. See Moncada, supra note 67, at 925–26.
84. See id. at 926.
85. Id. at 928–29.
86. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 627.
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Commission statements.”87 In so arguing, commentators believe that this type
of development is the “natural and logical outgrowth of multiple applications
of a particular general standard” and that “through a multitude of cases, a
detailed list of problematic security practices has emerged.”88
Similarly, the FTC takes the position that its public statements and its
past enforcement actions provide the industry with “notice of different
features of data-security that must be evaluated in order to maintain a
reasonable data-security program.”89 If this is so, this Note posits that those
statements and past enforcement actions are not sufficiently detailed to truly
put companies on notice. Furthermore, why has the FTC not simply
published this so-called list of guidelines to follow from past cases, as
conclusive? Commentators answer that “[t]here is no one-size fits all datasecurity model that can work for all business types and data-collection
models.”90 Further, they argue that the FTC’s “incorporation of qualitative
judgments into language that lacks specific qualitative standards or even any
qualitative standard is also a natural byproduct of the common law
process.”91 These arguments neglect to assess the fact that although the FTC
has mandated a vague baseline standard, this standard is not well established.
In just nine cases, only one of which has been published, has the FTC relied
“exclusively upon its ‘unfairness’ authority to establish de facto
cybersecurity standards.”92
Further, this analysis fails to adequately address the questions of whether
the FTC is appropriately applying its Section 5 authority in finding
unfairness, and whether it is imposing undue burdens on businesses by failing
to provide any guidance beyond that found in these nine cases.93 It seems
unjust for the FTC to expect companies to follow such broad and
inconclusive standards from only nine cases that exclusively target
“unfairness.”94 Further, although commentators have made different lists of
what they believe the FTC’s guidelines to be when determining unreasonable
security measures,95 who is to say that when the FTC sues the next company
that follows all of those “guidelines,” that it will not sue the company for
lacking a different, previously unmentioned security measure?
Commentators argue that the FTC’s Best Practices Guidelines and the
“Start with Security” guide96 inform companies on how to implement
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. at 638–39.
Id. at 649–50.
Caponi, supra note 59.
Moncada, supra note 67, at 939.
Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 569.
Bruce J. Heiman, Soyong Cho & Andrew L. Caplan, The FTC Has Already Set
Cybersecurity Standards, LAW360 (Mar. 5, 2015, 2:07 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/6264
47/the-ftc-has-already-set-cybersecurity-standards.
93. See Abbott, supra note 31, at 4 n.19.
94. See Heiman, Cho & Caplan, supra note 92.
95. See id.
96. See START WITH SECURITY, supra note 70.
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reasonable security measures and that, accordingly, the FTC has developed a
form of “soft law.”97 Again, as mentioned above, these are inconclusive
recommendations that do not have the force and effect of law; further, the
FTC has not explicitly stated that “the recommendations listed in the
publication are the focus of its data-security investigations under Section
5.”98
Finally, in response to the argument that the FTC must exercise its
optional rulemaking authority, some have argued that this would be too
burdensome and time consuming; they believe “it would render the
Commission’s authority useless because [it] would be too slow to respond to
pressing issues at hand, such as frequent data breaches.”99 However, an
effective case-by-case analysis can coexist with a set of guidelines for
companies to follow. Further, it is not unreasonable to request the FTC to
produce a set of specific guidelines for companies to follow to prevent suit—
especially since it has proven effective in other areas, such as the health and
financial spheres. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996 (HIPAA) Security Rule,100 which is “one of the most specific data
security laws,”101 lists safeguards that must be in place to ensure appropriate
protection of electronic health information. Similarly, Congress has imposed
requirements on firms in the financial sector, banks, and other financial
institutions, to meet the security requirements of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley
Act (GLBA)102 Safeguards Rule.103 The above argument is further hindered
by the fact that “the FTC has used rulemaking to implement other datasecurity-related laws” in the past.104 Since the FTC has used this authority
effectively before, there is no reason that the FTC cannot do so again.
III. CYBER INSURANCE
The cyber insurance industry, which did not exist fifteen years ago, was
created in response to regulation.105 “As regulators are becoming more
97. Moncada, supra note 67, at 932.
98. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 64, at 701.
99. Moncada, supra note 67, at 927–28. To illustrate the burden of rule-making, the Commission

must (1) publish a notice that states with particularity the proposed rule; (2) allow interested persons
to submit their “written data, view, and arguments;” and (3) hold an informal hearing to allow
interested persons to “cross-examine each other.” Id.
100. See generally The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA),
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1937 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320 (2012)).
101. See Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 655.
102. See Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1048–49 (however, GLBA is a standard, not a rule); See
generally Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–09 (2012)).
103. See generally Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–5
(2016).
104. Stegmaier & Bartnick, supra note 64, at 707.
105. See Allison Grande, Privacy ‘Bill Of Rights’ To Boost Demand For Breach Coverage,
LAW360 (Oct. 23, 2015, 5:58 PM), https://www.mayerbrown.com/files/News/13679f14-45c2-41ad
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aggressive in investigating data breaches and levying fines on affected
companies, this coverage has become increasingly important” in mitigating
financial liability.106 Today, the cybersecurity insurance market is the fastest
growing segment of the insurance industry, due to the rise of cyber threats.107
The cyber insurance market has more than doubled, growing from $1 billion
to $2.5 billion in the past two years.108 Still, the market has a long way to go;
it is estimated that only “one in three companies has insurance specifically to
protect against [data breach] losses.”109 However, in the era of immense, high
profile data breaches, companies are beginning to realize that they must take
proactive positions against the risk of loss—they must insure against the
inevitable.110
Due to the great potential liability resulting from a single data breach,
companies cannot afford to be without cybersecurity insurance.111 Since
companies believe that cyber attacks are so unpredictable, they reason that
cyber insurance is too expensive.112 However, as market and FTC pressures
increase, businesses are pushed towards better cybersecurity to remain
competitive. Moreover, “[a]s this new form of insurance continues to emerge
and develop, it is important for companies to understand the current state of
the market and the nature of the protection that they need in order to prudently
obtain coverage for cyber-security breaches.”113 It is imperative that
companies obtain cyber risk insurance when developing their risk
management programs.114 The most informed way to purchase cyber
insurance is to understand the risks to which the company is exposed.115
The most recent data breaches involving Target Corporation and Home
Depot cost these companies millions of dollars in financial damages.116 These
recent breaches have shown how enormous the liability from a single breach

-b5e0-f21f88f9d695/Presentation/NewsAttachment/d9cef92a-8587-410f-9ca3-e4ac0a5d83a4/Pri
vacyBillOfRightsToBoostDemandForBreachCoverage.pdf.
106. Grande, supra note 10 (quoting Rob Jones, Global Head of Fin. Lines Specialty Claims, Am,
Int’l Grp. Inc.).
107. See Garrie & Mann, supra note 26, at 379.
108. CYBERSECURITY MARKET REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
109. Michael N. DiCanio, Preparing for the Inevitable: Insurance for Data Breaches, N.Y. L.J.
(May 19, 2015), https://www.lowenstein.com/files/Publication/c8b97609-204a-4735-ae92-dd3c4c
292fb0/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/8ee423b0-aa5e-474d-9cb9-49a78ad1ec0c/Preparing
%20for%20the%20Inevitable_Insurance%20for%20Data%20Breaches.pdf.
110. See id.
111. Garrie & Mann, supra note 26, at 379.
112. See id. at 384.
113. Id. at 379.
114. See Howard B. Epstein & Theodore A. Keyes, Cyber-Risk Insurance Update, N.Y. L.J. (July
27, 2015), http://www.newyorklawjournal.com/id=1202733060552/CyberRisk-Insurance-Update
?slreturn=20160815192503.
115. See Diane D. Reynolds, How an Incident Response Plan Can Reduce Your Cyber Insurance
Costs, PRIVACY & DATA SECURITY INSIGHT (Oct. 20, 2015), http://www.privacyanddatasecurity
insight.com/2015/10/how-an-incident-response-plan-can-reduce-your-cyber-insurance-costs/.
116. See DiCanio, supra note 109.
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can be.117 In light of these breaches, it is imperative for companies to not only
obtain insurance, but to understand the insurance policies that they have
purchased. National and international reports suggest that, even faced with
these examples, a significant number of corporations of all sizes may lack
insurance that would sufficiently cover them in the event of a data breach.118
Compliance officers must ensure that their companies are adequately
protected by their insurance policies.
A. INSURANCE POLICIES
First, it is fundamental for companies to understand their insurance
policy’s cybersecurity coverage.119 Most companies have various forms of
traditional insurance policies that may cover cyber risks, such as commercial
general liability (CGL); only a few companies currently carry specialty
insurance policies that are specifically designed to afford coverage for cyber
risks.120 However, insurance companies are capitalizing on the increase in
data breaches by adding data breach exclusions to these types of CGL
policies and creating new specialized cyber insurance policies designed to
specifically insure against losses from hackers and other cyber threats.121
These cyber insurance policies are becoming more widely available122 as
CGL insurers are aggressively denying cyber risk coverage.123
Companies looking for coverage for cyber losses have generally looked
to their CGL policy, and these efforts have been met with mixed success in
the courts.124 The Insurance Services Office (ISO) has modified the standard
form CGL policy to address coverage for electronic-related publications into
the following three parts: “(1) Coverage A: Bodily Injury and Property
Damage Liability; (2) Coverage B: Personal and Advertising Injury Liability;
and (3) Coverage C: Medical Payments.”125 However, the cases in which
courts construed CGL policies for data breach claims might now be moot, as
the ISO “recently revised the standard CGL form to exclude data breaches
from coverage.”126 Although courts have yet to test the newest exclusions, it
117. For example, Target revealed that the data breach it suffered in 2013 had cost around $252
million and it received around $100 million from its insurance company. Home Depot lost $43
million from its data breach and received $15 million from its insurers. See Davis, Li-Ming Wong
& Paterson, supra note 6, at 646.
118. See id.
119. See Garrie & Mann, supra note 26, at 383.
120. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 542.
121. See Jim Vorhis & Joan Cotkin, How Courts Have Decided Coverage Issues in Cyber
Insurance Cases, L.A. LAW, Sept. 2015 at 37.
122. See Dan Zureich & William Graebe, Cybersecurity: The Continuing Evolution of Insurance
and Ethics, 82 DEF. COUNS. J. 192, 195 (2015).
123. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 382.
124. Zureich & Graebe, supra note 122, at 195.
125. Podolak, supra note 9, at 380.
126. See Zureich & Graebe, supra note 122, at 195. In 2001, the ISO revised the definition of
“property damage” to omit coverage for “electronic data.” See Podolak, supra note 5. In 2004, the

198

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 11

is inferable that these exclusions will create significant gaps in coverage for
cyber claims.127 Due to these gaps in CGL policies, companies must look to
obtaining stand-alone cyber insurance policies.
B. ATTEMPTS TO RECOVER LOSSES UNDER CGL POLICIES
Although claims involving “property damage” and “bodily injury” arise
often, today’s insurance litigation focuses primarily on coverage surrounding
the issue of “publication,” which triggers the “personal and advertising”
coverage.128 “Personal and advertising injury” is defined by the ISO to
include a list of enumerated offenses, including the offense of “[o]ral or
written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right
of privacy.”129 As most cyber-attacks on companies involve compromised
information, the principal issue is whether such compromised information
was a “publication” by the company.130
A recent highlighted case that deals with this issue is Zurich American
Insurance Co. v. Sony Corp. of America.131 The legal dispute in Zurich arose
between Sony and its insurers; this case highlights the challenges that
companies face in their attempt to persuade “insurance companies to cover
losses arising from cyber risks under CGL policies.”132 In Zurich, Sony
sought CGL “personal injury” coverage following a hack of its PlayStation
Network that resulted in stolen personal information of one hundred million
users.133 Zurich, the insurance company, “contend[ed] that the relevant policy
language ‘oral or written publication in any manner of the material that
violates a person’s right of privacy’ requires the publication be made by the
insured.” The court agreed with this argument.134
The Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, held that Zurich
and another insurance company “did not have a duty to defend because the
alleged publication was not ‘conducted or perpetrated by the policyholder’—

ISO added an exclusion for damages “arising out of the loss of, loss of use of, damage to, corruption
of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.” See id. In 2013, the ISO added an
optional endorsement that modified the “personal and advertising injury” definition to eliminate
coverage for “oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that violates a person’s right
of privacy” which was a key basis of coverage for data breach claims. See id. Finally, in 2014, the
ISO eliminated coverage for damages arising out of “any access to or disclosure of any person’s or
organization’s confidential or personal information . . . or [t]he loss of use of, damage to, corruption
of, inability to access, or inability to manipulate electronic data.” See id.
127. See Zureich & Graebe, supra note 122, at 196.
128. Podolak, supra note 9, at 383.
129. Anderson, supra note 8, at 544.
130. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 383.
131. See generally Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am. 6 N.Y.S.3d 915 (N.Y. App. Div.
1st Dep’t 2015).
132. Anderson, supra note 8, at 543.
133. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 390.
134. See id.
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a requirement not found in the language of the insurance policies.”135 The
judge stated that “‘insurance policies’ coverage for the oral or written
publication of materials that violate a person’s right to privacy could not be
triggered through the actions of third parties, in this case, the hackers . . . .
“136 In other words, because hackers stole the information, there was no
publication by Sony, and thus no coverage.137 In contrast to the holding in
Zurich, courts should hold that information compromised by third party
hackers does constitute a “publication,” and afford coverage for such
breaches,138 as the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia has
held.139
The Zurich courts decision seems at odds with the FTC’s reasoning for
bringing its suits against companies that have inadequate cybersecurity. First,
the relevant language in the CGL policy makes no mention of who must make
the publication. The underlying class action suit against Sony alleged that
Sony’s security measures permitted the hackers to gain access to the network,
meaning that Sony was responsible, as the FTC would argue, for the
publication; this should at least have triggered the duty to defend.140 Further,
if the court holds that this was not a publication by Sony, but rather a
publication by a third party, then how can the FTC sue and essentially blame
companies for these third party hacks? The FTC is suing companies for
publications by third parties, but they are not publications for insurers to
protect. Companies are taking a hit from multiple sides with no help,
prompting the need for stand-alone cyber risk insurance policies.
C. STAND-ALONE CYBER RISK INSURANCE
Recently, insurers have been marketing newer insurance products
specifically tailored to covering cyber risks—this coverage has been called
“the new frontier of the 21st century market.”141 This market was created in
response to many insurers removing cyber coverage from CGL and other

135. Bibeka Shrestha, Sony Fights Ruling That Nixed Data Breach Coverage, LAW360 (Apr. 11,
2014, 2:53 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/527570/sony-fights-ruling-that-nixed-data-brea
ch-coverage.
136. Id.
137. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 390.
138. See DiCanio, supra note 109.
139. See id. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia held in Travelers
Indemnity v. Portal Healthcare Solutions, that “making medical records accessible triggered the
policy coverage, even though no third-party was alleged to have viewed the information, because,
according to the court, ‘[p]ublication occurs when information is ‘placed before the public’ not
when a member of the public reads the information placed before it.’” Id.
140. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 390.
141. Anderson, supra note 8, at 591–92 (quoting Harry Cylinder, Evaluating Cyber Insurance,
CPCU EJOURNAL, Dec. 2008, at 1).
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traditional policies;142 in light of this change and court decisions such as
Zurich, stand-alone cyber risk policies can cover the insurance coverage gap,
giving companies an opportunity to mitigate the loss associated with a data
breach.143
This cyber insurance market is referred to as the “Wild West” of
insurance, as new policies are created on a regular basis and as old policies
are constantly updated and revised.144 However, what is clear is that the
market intends for stand-alone cyber insurance policies and general CGL
policies to work together.145 Today, in most standard CGL policies, property
damages coverage for electronic data146 losses is limited to losses “that result
from physical injury to tangible property, with tangible property being
defined so as not to include electronic data.”147 On the other hand, standalone cyber policies tend to exclude coverage for property damage claims.148
In light of inconsistent court decisions regarding CGL policy coverage, it is
essential to companies’ protection to receive advice on how to proceed in
obtaining full coverage, using both types of policies.
Due to the increased publicity surrounding cybersecurity breaches and
the insurance market for these breaches, the market is competitive—forcing
cyber insurance plans to be greatly negotiable.149 When companies are
deciding which cyber insurance plan to purchase, they will want to obtain a
cyber insurance policy that will:
(1) defend and indemnify against claims alleging a data privacy incident or
a breach of network security; and (2) pay the costs to investigate
forensically a data privacy or cybersecurity incident, pay for an attorney . .
. , [pay to] cover the costs to send out letters notifying individuals about the
incident . . . , [and] pay the costs of credit or fraud monitoring products
offered to affected individuals.150

In addition, companies should take advantage of policies that adhere to third
party liabilities, as well as first party cyber loss. Third party cyber liability
policies usually cover the insured company against liability arising from
142. See generally Jeff Sistrunk, Sony Hack Shows Need for Cyber Coverage On Many Fronts,
LAW360 (Jan. 9, 2015, 2:04 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/609561/sony-hack-shows-needfor-cyber-coverage-on-many-fronts.
143. See Epstein & Keyes, supra note 114.
144. See SCOTT GODES, UNDERSTANDING DEVELOPMENTS IN CYBERSPACE LAW: LEADING
LAWYERS ON ANALYZING RECENT TRENDS, CASE LAWS, AND LEGAL STRATEGIES AFFECTING
THE INTERNET LANDSCAPE 45, 46 (2015).
145. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 403–04.
146. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 571–72 (electronic data is defined as “information, facts or
programs stored as or on, created or used on, or transmitted to or from computer software, including
systems and applications software, hard or floppy disks, CDROMs, tapes, drives, cells, data
processing devices or any other media which are used with electronically controlled equipment.”).
147. Podolak, supra note 9, at 403.
148. See id. at 403–04.
149. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 594.
150. GODES, supra note 144, at 46–47.
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hacks and other third party data breaches. The types of events that give rise
to this coverage include a failure to secure data, theft of property, network
security failure, and/or acts, errors, or omissions of employees or third party
vendors.151
On the other hand, companies will want to be cognizant of cyber risk
policies that include important exclusions. Although “in many cases these
exclusions are intended to limit coverage to the specialty area of cyber risk
and to avoid overlapping with general liability, D&O or other insurance
policies,”152 because of the increased need for these policies, companies need
to make sure that the policies are not excluding necessary coverage.
Specifically, companies need to beware of cyber insurance policies that
“expressly require that a loss be directly caused by, or solely and directly
caused by, an insured cause,” because this would again exclude liability for
third party hacks,153 similar to the Zurich case.
It is important to recognize that cyber risk insurers are aware of the fact
that companies are purchasing this insurance in response to alleged
governmental regulation and statutory violations.154 This is exemplified by
the National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Coinstar,
Inc.155 decision, where the court denied insurance coverage.156 As Coinstar
demonstrates, insurance companies are increasingly using governmental
regulation and statutory violations to deny coverage for cyber breaches;157
companies must beware of this exclusion.
As with every decision regarding insurance, companies must look to the
costs of these insurance policies. The unpredictable probability and costs of
data breaches make cybersecurity insurance very expensive.158 For example,
in 2013, cybersecurity insurance premiums totaled $1.3 billion.159 Moreover,
because of the high costs of this type of insurance, companies are put in the
position of choosing whether to spend money on cybersecurity insurance or
to invest in technology that they believe will improve their cybersecurity.160
It is argued that because companies are beginning to invest in this type of
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

See Anderson, supra note 8, at 595.
Epstein & Keyes, supra note 114.
Podolak, supra note 9, at 405.
See id.
See generally Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Coinstar, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 3d 1149
(W.D. Wash. 2014).
156. See Thomas B. Caswell, 2014 May Be Cyber Insurance’s Most Popular Year Yet, LAW360
(Mar. 21, 2014, 12:36 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/520146/2014-may-be-cyberinsurance
-s-most-popular-year-yet (explaining that on February 28, 2014, the U.S. District Court for Seattle
ruled in National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Coinstar Inc., that “the common
liability policy exclusion for a ‘violation of statute in connection with sending, transmitting or
communicating any material or information’ served to preclude any coverage for the hacking of PII
from Coinstar’s video rental kiosks.”).
157. See Podolak, supra note 9, at 405.
158. See Garrie & Mann, supra note 26, at 384.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 385.
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insurance, that if these policies “indemnify state actions, administrative fines,
property damage, business interruption, and consumer lawsuits arising from
a breach,” companies will not have an incentive to devote sufficient resources
to their own security measures in an attempt to prevent such breaches.161 This
argument is flawed—because the main purpose of cyber risk insurance
policies is to allow the insured to transfer the risk of a breach or compromise
of its network, “[i]t comes as no surprise . . . that insurers concentrate on the
implementation and maintenance of appropriate security and IT protocols as
the foundation of the coverage.”162 Insurance companies will even deny
coverage to companies that do not have the cybersecurity measures in place
that they deem sufficient.163
Further, the Department of Homeland Security has stated that “a robust
cybersecurity insurance market could help reduce the number of successful
cyber attacks by: (1) promoting the adoption of preventative measures in
return for more coverage and (2) encouraging the implementation of best
practices by basing premiums on an insured’s level of self-protection.”164 In
addition, according to the Ponemon Institute, “preparing for a breach can
greatly reduce the cost of a breach.”165 Insurers will reward the companies
that choose to take precautionary steps, including “implement[ing] defensive
measures such as an incident response plan and designat[ing] a team to
execute that plan.”166 As such, it is likely that if a company spends a great
deal on its cybersecurity infrastructure, cyber insurance agencies will offer
insurance at a lower premium.167
As interpretations of cyber insurance policies are still in their infancy, it
is crucial that companies understand their insurance policies and their risk in
this developing area of law.168 To do so, companies need courts to affirm
solid and dependable insurance risk transfer strategies; “and now that the area
of insurance for privacy and cyber security risks is expanding, there is likely
to be an explosion of litigation regarding the meaning of insurance policies
that cover these new and burgeoning risks.”169 It is essential that companies
can follow settled law regarding cyber insurance, as the objective of such

161. Id.
162. Podolak, supra note 9, at 406.
163. See GODES, supra note 144, at 47–48 (explaining that in Columbia Casualty Company vs.

Cottage Health System, a CNA insurance company sued Cottage Health, the insured, for failing to
maintain minimum security practices; they argued that such failure allowed CNA to avoid covering
the claim).
164. Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 647 (quoting the Department of
Homeland Security).
165. Reynolds, supra note 115.
166. Id.
167. See Garrie & Mann, supra note 26, at 385.
168. See GODES, supra note 144, at 57.
169. Id.
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insurance is to give companies an additional layer of financial security in
times of heightened government regulation.170
IV. THE NEED FOR CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION AND
GUIDELINES
A. FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF HIPAA AND GLBA
“It is no longer a matter of if a breach is going to happen, but rather
when.”171 As argued in Part II supra, prevention will never be enough and
therefore, the FTC should not have the authority to sue companies for not
implementing cybersecurity practices that neither the FTC, nor Congress,
have ever set out. Instead, Congress should pass legislation for the corporate
business sphere, similar to HIPAA in the health sphere and GLBA in the
financial sphere. Similar to HIPAA and GLBA, the newly established
legislation should give power to the FTC to institute guidelines for companies
to follow when implementing security procedures; if done, these companies
will know how to sufficiently protect themselves pursuant to the FTC’s
standards.
To begin, “[t]he financial sector is more secure than other industries and
operates under specific cybersecurity mandates embedded in law. This
correlation is no coincidence.”172 In 1999, President Clinton signed GLBA
into law.173 Subtitle A of GLBA Title V requires the FTC and other federal
agencies to “establish appropriate standards for the financial institutions . . .
relating to administrative, technical, and physical safeguards” for certain
information.174 The FTC issued the Safeguards Rule,175 which “requires
financial institutions under FTC jurisdiction to have measures in place to
keep customer information secure.”176 The FTC believes that this rule strikes
an appropriate balance between allowing flexibility to financial institutions
and establishing standards of safeguarding consumer information.177 If the
FTC struck a balance there, it should do the same in the corporate business
sphere as well. Further, there is evidence that GLBA’s dilute mandate
170. See id.
171. Patricia Bailin & Arielle Brown, Preparing for A Data Breach: Data Security Regulations

and Best Practices, 32 WESTLAW J. COMPUTER & INTERNET 1, 1 (2015).
172. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1050.
173. See Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. §§ 314.1–5 (2016).
174. 15 U.S.C. § 6801(b) (2012) (explaining that the objectives of these standards are to: “(1)
[e]nsure the security and confidentiality of customer records and information; (2) protect against
any anticipated threats [to the security of] such records; and (3) protect against unauthorized access
to or use of such records or information [that could cause harm to the customer].”).
175. See generally 16 C.F.R. § 314.
176. Financial Institutions and Customer Information: Complying with the Safeguards Rule,
FED. TRADE COMM’N (Apr. 2006), https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/guidance/fin
ancial-institutions-customer-information-complying [hereinafter Complying with the Safeguards
Rule].
177. See 16 C.F.R. § 314.
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increases cybersecurity for financial institutions; “[i]n a study by WhiteHat
Security, banking websites had the fewest average serious security
vulnerabilities of any industry. . . .”178 If the FTC’s main goal is to prevent
cyber attacks, the best way to do that is to follow the financial industry’s lead.
HIPAA Title II, similar to GLBA, requires the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to draft rules to increase the efficiency of the health
care system by creating standards and guidelines for the use and
dissemination of health care information, in order to protect the privacy and
security of such information.179 The Security Rule180 was adopted in 2003181
to implement the provisions of HIPAA. HIPAA’s Security Rule is known to
be “one of the most specific data security laws,”182 and the new cybersecurity
regulation guidelines for the corporate business sphere should mimic its
structure.
Congress needs to pass legislation that gives the FTC authority to adopt
a rule or regulation such as the Safeguards Rule and the Security Rule
mentioned above. In doing so, “[a] regulatory strategy must be developed to
strike a healthy balance between consumer-privacy interests and companies’
interests in innovation and profit. Data-security enforcement standards
cannot be so rigid as to stifle business growth or give hackers time to exploit
the rules.”183 The following guidelines are recommendations for the first
proposed rule in hopes to solicit comments to improve the guidelines to strike
this balance.184 This set of guidelines is not a one-size-fits all list; instead, it
is meant to give companies guidance on how to structure their own security
programs to avoid suit by the FTC in the event of a breach.185

178. Bambauer, supra note 15, at 1049.
179. See Summary of the HIPAA Security Rule, U.S. DEP’T

OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/srsummary.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2015)
[hereinafter Summary of HIPAA].
180. See CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., SECURITY STANDARDS: ADMINISTRATIVE
SAFEGUARDS 27–28 (2007) [hereinafter SECURITY STANDARDS], https://www.hhs.gov/sites/de
fault/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/administrative/securityrule/adminsafeguards.pdf (providing that the
Security Rule has three safeguard guidelines sections: (1) Administrative Safeguards in §164.308;
(2) Physical Safeguards in §164.301; and (3) Technical Safeguards in §164.312).
181. See generally Summary of HIPAA, supra note 179.
182. Solove & Hartzog, supra note 2, at 655 (explaining that “the HIPAA Security Rule requires
organizations to access the control risk by implementing security programs, testing the company’s
data security, ensuring that outside data vendors secure data, training employees in data security,
and implementing authentication and access control procedures.” In addition, this security rule
“requires technical safeguards, such as identification access controls and encryption, and physical
safeguards, such as secure data disposal and physical access safeguards.”).
183. Moncada, supra note 67, at 941.
184. See Department of Health and Human Services, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334 (Feb. 20, 2003).
185. See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 650.
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B. RECOMMENDATION OF GUIDELINES TO IMPLEMENT186
Companies are required to deter, detect, and defend against security
breaches.187 To start, companies must form a compliance team to understand
and relay to their employees the correct way to comply with the new
guidelines. Next, companies must hire a security team of cybersecuritycertified experts to work with the compliance team in implementing the
safeguard guidelines below. This security team shall “develop, implement,
and maintain a comprehensive information security program that . . . contains
administrative, technical, and physical safeguards that are appropriate to [the
company’s] size and complexity, the nature and scope of [the company’s]
activities, and the sensitivity of any customer information at issue.”188 If a
corporate entity fails to follow the guidelines listed below, and a data breach
follows, the entity will be on notice that the FTC has the authority to bring
action for such violations.
First, there must be an employee management and training division,
where the company will be required to designate a privacy team responsible
for developing and implementing its privacy policies and procedures.189
Therein, the company shall designate one Security Official for the overall
responsibility of the development and implementation of security
procedures.190 This security team shall: (1) conduct a background check on
each employee who will have access to customer information;191 (2) train its
engineers in secure coding;192 and (3) train the company’s employees on its
privacy policies and procedures, including basic steps to maintain the
security, confidentiality, and integrity of customer information.193 In doing
so, the company shall implement a security awareness and training program
for all of the employees to complete.194
Next, each company must have information systems to identify
reasonably foreseeable internal and external risks to the security,
confidentiality, and integrity of customer information,195 and assess the
sufficiency of any safeguards in place to control those risks. To do this, each
company shall “[c]onduct an accurate and thorough assessment of the
potential risks and vulnerabilities to the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of electronic protected . . . information held by the [company].”196
186. The following proposed guidelines were created by using and combining the published
findings from the FTC’s holdings in data-breach cases and the guidelines in GLBA and HIPAA.
187. See generally Complying with the Safeguards Rule, supra note 176.
188. Standards for Safeguarding Customer Information, 16 C.F.R. § 314.3(a) (2016).
189. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2012).
190. See SECURITY STANDARDS, supra note 180, at 8.
191. Complying with the Safeguards Rule, supra note 176.
192. See START WITH SECURITY, supra note 70.
193. Complying with the Safeguards Rule, supra note 176.
194. See SECURITY STANDARDS, supra note 180, at 14.
195. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2012).
196. SECURITY STANDARDS, supra note 180, at 4.
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Therein, each company shall only collect information from consumers that
the employees, based on their security training, believe is necessary.197 When
the necessary information is collected, the company must dispose of it when
the legitimate business need for it has subsided.198 In addition, the company
shall restrict employee access to a “need to know” basis and tailor
administrative controls specifically to each employee’s job needs.199
Each security team must develop technical safeguards to protect its
information by implementing technical policies and procedures for its
electronic information system.200 In doing so, the company shall develop a
unique authentication process. In addition to the use of passwords, companies
should implement more secure authentication methods such as tokens or
biometrics in which the employee must, for example, use his or her
fingerprint and then type in his or her unique identification password.201 This
system should automatically log the user out after a thirty-minute period of
inactivity. Further, companies shall implement a mechanism to encrypt
electronic information to secure confidential material during storage and
transmission; in doing so, the team shall make sure that the cryptography is
secure throughout its lifecycle, not just during the initial transmission.202 To
do this, the data security team shall use a “tried-and-true industry tested and
accepted method[]” to ensure the upmost trusted protection.203
Next, the company must “[i]mplement procedures to regularly review
records of information system activity, such as audit logs, access reports, and
security incident tracking reports.”204 The security team shall test the system
for vulnerabilities at least once a week and must have intrusion detection and
prevention software to monitor the network for suspicious hacking activity.
In addition, there must be sufficient measures in place that have been tested
to detect unauthorized access to its network.205 Further, the team shall set
security alerts and have an effective process in place to receive, address, and
respond to security vulnerability reports and alerts.206 The team shall evaluate
and adjust the program in light of relevant circumstances, including changes
in the firm’s business or operations, or the results of security testing and
monitoring; they must update and test procedures regularly to address
vulnerabilities that have the potential to arise.207 The company must
continuously improve its system to keep up with the fast-changing pace of
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

See START WITH SECURITY, supra note 70, at 2.
See id.
Id. at 3.
See Department of Health and Human Services, 68 Fed. Reg. 8334, 8356 (Feb. 20, 2003).
See Gupta, Lahiff & Swaminathan, supra note 63, at 7; see also Security Standards for the
Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.312 (2016).
202. See START WITH SECURITY, supra note 70, at 6.
203. See id.; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.312.
204. Department of Health and Human Services, 68 Fed. Reg. at 8377.
205. See START WITH SECURITY, supra note 70, at 8.
206. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801(b), 6805(b)(2) (2012).
207. See id.
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cybersecurity attacks, strategies, and regulator activity. 208 Each employee
must sign a statement of adherence to the security policies and procedures
and, if violated, the employee will be subject to209 a set of disciplinary
procedures set out by the company.210
Further, each corporate entity must select service providers that can
maintain appropriate safeguards; the company must make sure its contract
requires service providers to maintain safeguards, and the company must
oversee service providers’ handling of customer information.211 The security
team shall continue to monitor to ensure that the service provider is meeting
the company’s requirements.212 The company shall request that detailed
records be kept on parties with access to the corporation’s data stores and
shall ensure that third parties entrusted with this access have data security
policies of comparable strength to the corporation.213
In the event that a breach occurs, the company must have an established
incident response plan including a response team, developed procedures for
working with law enforcement, a customer notification and assistance
process,214 and a contingency plan that includes a disaster recovery plan. 215
The company must mitigate any harmful effect it learns was caused by use
or disclosure of protected information. In doing so, it must: (1) take
immediate action to secure any information that has been compromised; (2)
preserve and review files or programs that may reveal how the breach
occurred; and (3) if feasible, bring in security professionals to help assess the
breach.216
Lastly, each company must develop a Written Information Security Plan
(WISP) outlining their security practices so that, if a breach does occur, the
company can readily hand the WISP over to the FTC and the company’s
insurance provider to promptly address the issue of whether the company
took reasonable security precautions.217 The WISP shall document the
information collected and stored by the company, along with the protocols,
based on the guidelines, for handling each record.218
The FTC cannot regulate the aforementioned list of guidelines without
receiving the power to do so from Congress. Only then will the FTC have the
authority to regulate any company whose database stores consumer data.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 652–53.
See SECURITY STANDARDS, supra note 180, at 6.
See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 649.
See Complying with the Safeguards Rule, supra note 176, at 2.
Id.
See Davis, Li-Ming Wong & Paterson, supra note 6, at 652.
See Bailin & Brown, supra note 171, at 3.
See Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information, 45
C.F.R. § 164.308(a)(7)(i) (2016).
216. Complying with the Safeguards Rule, supra note 176, at 5; see also SECURITY STANDARDS,
supra note 180, at 17.
217. See Bailin & Brown, supra note 171, at 2.
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Companies will be required to meet the guidelines eventually set out as
formal rules by creating a security team to implement the guideline
procedures. Companies that meet these guidelines will ensure protection
against FTC suit, as well as coverage from their insurance company.
CONCLUSION
In this era of increasingly sophisticated cyber crime, where “[e]very 79
seconds, personal data [is] stolen,”219 the corporate business sphere is in
desperate need of data security implementation guidelines. Companies are
suffering significantly due to the FTC’s data security enforcement litigation.
As of now, in the absence of any Congressional action, the FTC is an
inappropriate body to handle these types of breaches, and because it
continues to do so, it is imperative that companies protect themselves with
the aforementioned cyber insurance policies. The legislation enacted by
Congress, and thereafter the data security rules and guidelines promulgated
by government agencies in the financial and health spheres, have been
successful; it is therefore at this point necessary for the corporate business
sphere to follow their lead and look to this Note’s proposed solution.
Companies must be put on notice to not only protect consumers from the risk
of information loss, but to protect the companies themselves from FTC
action.
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